Hidden entities and experimental practice: towards a two-way traffic between history and philosophy of science by Arabatzis, Theodore
 1 
Hidden entities and experimental practice: towards a two-way traffic between 
history and philosophy of science 
Theodore Arabatzis 
University of Athens 
1. Introduction 
The significance of the philosophy of science for understanding historically scientific 
practice has not been sufficiently appreciated. Of course, the relationship between the 
history of science and the philosophy of science has been discussed extensively. The 
discussion, however, has been one-sided—occupied for the most part with the 
importance of the history of science for the philosophical understanding of science. 
Most commentators have viewed the history of science as a repository of empirical 
material for testing philosophical theories of scientific rationality or scientific change. 
On the other hand, there has been very little discussion of the ways in which the 
philosophy of science can enrich historiographical practice. Some authors have even 
denied that the philosophy of science has anything to offer to historians of science. 
Thomas Kuhn’s words are characteristic: "I do not think current philosophy of science 
has much relevance for the historian of science" (Kuhn 1977, 12). Kuhn made that 
statement in the 1970s, but it captures the attitude of many historians ever since. The 
historians' skepticism towards the historiographical value of philosophy of science may 
have been justified, in view of some procrustean attempts to "apply" philosophical 
theories of scientific change to historical case studies. Nevertheless, as I have argued 
elsewhere, philosophy of science has a significant historiographical role: to analyze the 
philosophical presuppositions of historiographical categories (e.g., the category of 
scientific discovery) and choices (e.g., choosing the subject of a historical narrative). 
(See Arabatzis 2006.) When I say that historians may profit from philosophy of science 
I do not have in mind philosophical positions that can be adopted wholesale in historical 
interpretation; rather my point is that an awareness of certain philosophical issues and 
debates may enrich historical work. Conversely, by drawing on those issues for the 
purposes of historical interpretation one may come up with novel philosophical insights. 
Here I agree fully with Hasok Chang (Chang 2007). 
 Let me present very briefly two examples from my previous work (Arabatzis 
2006) that illustrate in a concrete manner what I have in mind. The first concerns 
scientific discovery. The apparently descriptive statement "X discovered Y" embodies 
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an evaluative judgment, namely that the evidence presented by X demonstrated Y’s 
existence. Furthermore, the concept of scientific discovery has realist presuppositions: if 
we discover something then, no doubt, this something exists. Thus, scientific discovery, 
as a historiographical category, is bound to the issue of scientific realism. In order to 
narrate a discovery episode the historian should be aware of the complexities of that 
issue and take into account that the apparently innocent question "when and by whom 
was something discovered?" is not merely a request for factual information but requires 
conceptual analysis. The point of such an analysis should be, in my view, to chart a 
neutral ground that is shared by realists and anti-realists alike and, thus, to make 
possible the construction of historical narratives that would be acceptable to audiences 
of different philosophical persuasions. 
 My second example concerns the philosophical issue of conceptual change and 
its implications for choosing the subject of a historical narrative. If concepts evolve and 
cease to refer to the same entities, as Kuhn and Feyerabend have famously argued, then, 
prima facie, they are not good candidates for historical subjects. In view of conceptual 
variance it seems to be impossible to construct a coherent narrative of the development 
of a concept. Quentin Skinner has made this point in no uncertain terms:  
as soon as we see there is no determinate idea to which various writers 
contributed, but only a variety of statements made with the words by a variety of 
different agents with a variety of intentions, then what we are seeing is equally 
that there is no history of the idea to be written (Skinner 1969, 38) 
In my work on the history of the electron I tried to address Skinner's challenge vis-à-vis 
the history of scientific concepts. To that effect I have drawn upon the considerable 
philosophical literature on meaning change. In the process I hope I have shed new light 
on some of the philosophical issues involved. It would take me too far astray to present, 
even in outline, this literature and my own take on it.
1
 For our purposes here, the 
important point is the relevance of a philosophical issue to a historiographical problem. 
 In this talk I want to investigate further the prospects of integrated HPS, by 
examining how philosophical issues concerning experimental practice and scientific 
realism can enrich the historical investigation of the careers of "hidden entities," entities 
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that are not accessible to unmediated observation. Conversely, I will suggest that the 
history of those entities has important lessons to teach to the philosophy of science. 
Thus, my aim is to illustrate the possibility of a fruitful two-way traffic between history 
and philosophy of science. 
 
2. Why use the term "hidden entities"? 
2
  
Let me start with a comment on my choice of terms. I have chosen the term "hidden 
entities" instead of other more familiar terms, such as "unobservable entities" or 
"theoretical entities", for the following reasons. First, I wanted to avoid the thorny 
issues surrounding the observable-unobservable distinction. This distinction 
immediately invites questions about the boundary between the observable and the 
unobservable and about its epistemic significance. Forty five years ago Grover Maxwell 
argued that it is not possible to draw a sharp dividing line between the observable and 
the unobservable realms and, therefore, the distinction in question lacked any 
epistemological and ontological significance (Maxwell 1962). This issue has been 
debated by philosophers of science ever since, especially after Van Fraassen reinstated 
the distinction and placed it at the centre of his constructive empiricist epistemology. 
The advantage of using the term "hidden", in this respect, is that we leave open the 
possibility of the hidden becoming disclosed. 
 Second, I have also avoided the term "theoretical entities", even though I used it 
elsewhere, because it conveys the misleading impression that hidden entities do not 
transcend the theoretical framework in which they are embedded. In fact, these entities 
are trans-theoretical objects, which cut across different theories or even entire 
disciplines. Several philosophers of science have stressed their trans-theoretical 
character. On the one hand, philosophers such as Nancy Cartrwright and Ian Hacking 
have emphasized the synchronic dimension of the trans-theoretical character of hidden 
entities. Witness Cartwright’s remark concerning "the electron, about which we have a 
large number of incomplete and sometimes conflicting theories" (Cartwright 1983, 92). 
On the other hand, philosophers such as Dudley Shapere and Hillary Putnam have 
pointed out the diachronic dimension of the trans-theoretical character of hidden 
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entities, that is, the fact that these entities are usually the objects of consecutive 
scientific theories. Furthermore, the term "theoretical entities" undervalues completely 
the fact that many of the entities in question become experimental objects that are 
investigated in the laboratory, often without any guidance from a systematic theory 
about their nature. 
 Of course, I could have used other terms, such as "inferred entities" or 
"hypothetical entities". For the period in which my work has focused so far (the late 19
th
 
and early 20
th
 centuries) the terms "hidden" or "invisible" entities have the additional 
advantage that they denote an actors’ category. Heinrich Hertz, for instance, in his 
posthumously published Principles of Mechanics (1894) remarked that "the form of the 
atoms, their connection, their motion in most cases – all these are entirely hidden from 
us" (Hertz 1956, 18). And the French experimental physicist Jean Perrin described the 
aim of science in these colourful terms:  
In studying a machine, we do not confine ourselves only to the consideration of 
its visible parts … We certainly observe these visible pieces as closely as we 
can, but at the same time we seek to divine the hidden gears and parts that 
explain its apparent motions. 
 To divine in this way the existence and properties of objects that still lie 
outside our ken, to explain the complications of the visible in terms of invisible 
simplicity, is the function of the intuitive intelligence which, thanks to men such 
as Dalton and Boltzmann, has given us the doctrine of Atoms. (Perrin 1916, vii.) 
In our constructivist age, the term "hidden" may have some objectionable overtones, 
suggesting a pre-existing reality waiting to be disclosed. I think, however, that one may 
adopt a distinction between a hidden and a manifest realm, while remaining neutral in 
metaphysical disputes concerning the nature of reality. 
 
3. A glance at the role of hidden entities in the history of the physical sciences: the 
historical roots of a philosophical problem  
The explanation of phenomena by postulating hidden entities has been a significant 
aspect of the sciences, at least since the 17
th
 century. Think, for instance, of the central 
tenet of the mechanical philosophy, namely that the fundamental constituents of the 
world are imperceptible material particles in constant motion. Those particles (e.g. 
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Descartes' corpuscles) were introduced for explanatory purposes, to accommodate 
various phenomena within a mechanical framework. In the following centuries we 
witness a multiplication of novel entities, most of which were introduced for similar 
reasons, that is, to accommodate within a mechanical framework phenomena that were 
not easily susceptible to mechanical explanation. For example, the 18
th
 century subtle 
fluids were posited to make mechanical sense of phenomena, such as electricity and 
magnetism, which seemed to involve action at a distance. Similarly the 19
th
 century 
luminiferous ether was put forward to incorporate light within a mechanical framework. 
Thus, many of the hidden objects of 18
th
 and 19
th
 century natural philosophy were 
introduced in response to a conceptual difficulty faced by the mechanical tradition, 
which could not tolerate the obscure phenomenon of action at a distance. 
In the 19
th
 century, other hidden entities, such as the atom, were invoked to 
systematize and explain empirical regularities (e.g., the laws of definite and multiple 
proportions). Many scientists, however, thought of "atoms" as dispensable fictions and 
the question of their ontological status remained open throughout the century. And, 
finally, in the 20
th
 century, with the birth of microphysics and genetics, we witness a 
real explosion in the number of the hidden entities that populate the world, ranging from 
various elementary particles to genes. 
This brief and impressionistic historical sketch, indicates that hidden entities 
have often (always?) been introduced for explanatory purposes. Some of them (e.g., the 
subtle fluids) were subjected to experimental investigation, whereas others (e.g., the 
ether) were resistant to experimental detection. Thus, entire domains of theoretical and 
experimental practice have been structured around hidden entities. This fact alone 
would suffice to render these entities historiographically significant. Furthermore, they 
are puzzling from a philosophical point of view. While they had been focal points of 
theoretical and experimental investigation, several of them turned out to be fictitious. 
For this reason, perhaps, the philosophical literature concerning these entities has 
focused on the problem of scientific realism, that is, on the grounds that we have for 
believing in their existence. 
Among the origins of this problem is the so-called underdetermination of theory 
by evidence, namely the fact that there can be more than one hypotheses or theories that 
are compatible with the phenomena. This problem had been discussed since antiquity. 
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The introduction and proliferation of hidden entities, however, made it more intractable. 
Any inductive generalization faces "horizontal" underdetermination, but with the 
hypothetical postulation of entities "underneath" the phenomena one has to worry also 
about "vertical" underdetermination.
3
 
 
4. Bypassing underdetermination: Cartwright and Hacking on entity realism  
There have been various attempts to come to terms with the problem of 
underdetermination. The one I will discuss here was put forward by Ian Hacking, who 
tried to bypass this problem by focusing on experimental practice and the specific mode 
of causal reasoning that is employed in that practice. A similar view has been adopted 
and further developed by Nancy Cartwright. Instrumentation and experimentation, in 
Hacking’s and Cartwright’s view, can provide, under certain circumstances, unmediated 
(largely theory-free) access to the hidden reality behind the appearances. Hacking has 
argued that the manipulation of hidden entities in the laboratory compels us to be 
realists about them. The uses of hidden entities as investigative probes and as 
engineering tools leave little room for doubting their existence. Hidden entities cease to 
be hypothetical when we succeed in manipulating them. For instance, the reality of 
electrons is beyond reasonable doubt, since we have devices with which we can spray 
them. In Hacking’s seductive words, "if you can spray them, then they are real" (see 
Hacking 1983, 22ff.). Of course, it may turn out that our theoretical representations of 
electrons and their properties are mistaken, but it is highly unlikely that electrons will 
turn out to be fictitious. Cartwright concurs:  
I agree with Hacking that when we can manipulate our theoretical entities in fine 
and detailed ways to intervene in other processes, then we have the best 
evidence possible for our claims about what they can and cannot do; and 
theoretical entities that have been warranted by well-tested causal claims like 
that are seldom discarded in the progress of science. (Cartwright 1983, p. 98) 
This version of realism, as several commentators have pointed out, faces several 
difficulties.
4
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5. Problems of entity realism: a role for history of science 
5a. Perhaps the main difficulty is that the premise of Hacking’s argument, namely that 
we can spray electrons, begs the question by assuming "what is under dispute" (van 
Fraassen 1985, 298). "Manipulation" is a success term—we cannot manipulate 
something that does not exist (cf. Nola 2002, 5). Perhaps that is why Hacking calls his 
"conclusion … obvious, even trifling" (Hacking 1983, 146). The very description of an 
act of laboratory manipulation as "spraying of electrons" presupposes the existence of 
electrons. To put it another way, our confidence in the existence of electrons must 
precede our claim that we successfully manipulate electrons (cf. Seager 1995, 467-468).  
 
5b. A related difficulty is what I will call the "manipulation of what" problem: before 
we invoke manipulability as a demonstrative principle, we need to identify the entity 
that we manipulate. In many experimental situations we manipulate something without 
knowing what kind of thing we manipulate. For instance, in the last quarter of the 19
th
 
century several physicists manipulated cathode rays, experimental objects that were 
produced in the discharge of electricity through gases at very low pressure. The 
identification of cathode rays with electrons at the end of the 19
th
 century revealed that 
the earlier manipulations of cathode rays had been, in fact, manipulations of electrons. 
Prior to that identification, however, the physicists who manipulated cathode rays did 
not know what kind of thing they manipulated. Hacking has claimed that "from the very 
beginning people were less testing the existence of electrons than interacting with them" 
(Hacking 1983, 262). Actually, people were interacting with electrons well before they 
even suspected their existence. Thus, manipulability, by itself, cannot establish the 
existence of, say, electrons, as opposed to cathode rays or an "I know-not-what" 
something (cf. Achinstein 2001, 412; and Boon 2004, 229). 
 To put it another way, the "material realization"
5
 of an experiment can be 
compatible with a plurality of descriptions (and theoretical interpretations) of what is 
going on in the experiment. Since the material realization of an experiment 
underdetermines its theoretical interpretation, the question "What entity is being 
manipulated in the experiment in question?" cannot be answered merely on the basis of 
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the experimental operations performed by the experimenter. The epistemic gap from our 
manipulations of "apparent" entities to the existence of hidden entities can only be 
bridged by our representations of the hidden world. 
 
5c. And this brings me back to the problem of underdetermination. One would expect 
that theoretical explanations as well as entity-based explanations of phenomena face 
equally this problem. Nancy Cartwright, however, has argued that there is an 
asymmetry in these two kinds of explanation. Only entity-based explanations are 
exempt from underdetermination:  
We can infer the truth of an explanation only if there are no alternatives that 
account in an equally satisfactory way for the phenomena. In physics nowadays, 
I shall argue, an acceptable causal story is supposed to satisfy this requirement. 
But exactly the opposite is the case with the specific equations and models that 
make up our theoretical explanations. There is redundancy of theoretical 
treatment, but not of causal account (Cartwright 1983, p. 76). 
The problem here, as I see it, is that Cartwright assumes that the current absence of 
alternatives implies the absence of alternatives period. One could very well conceive of 
the existence of two or more causal accounts of the same phenomena, based on the 
existence of altogether different entities. After all, in the history of the sciences there 
have been such cases—for instance, a phlogiston-based and an oxygen-based account of 
combustion (Arabatzis 2001, S534; Carrier 1993, 401-403). I don’t see how this 
possibility could be excluded (cf. Clarke 2001, 719 and Gelfert 2003, 248). 
 
5d. I have argued, so far, that the putative manipulation of a hidden entity is not a 
sufficient criterion for establishing its existence. Is it a necessary one? In response to his 
critics, Hacking has recognized the variety of standards of proof, in addition to 
manipulability, that are brought to bear, within scientific practice, on the existence of 
hidden entities.  
My experimental argument for entity realism may imply a sufficient 
(epistemological) condition for holding that an entity exists. But it does not 
imply a necessary condition. There may be many kinds of evidence that an 
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entity exists. I hold only that manipulationability is the best evidence" (Hacking 
1995/96, 540). 
Thus, manipulability should not be interpreted as a necessary condition for belief in the 
existence of a hidden entity. A difficulty remains, however: within scientific practice 
manipulability is sometimes (often?) not considered the "best proof" or the "best 
evidence" in favour of an entity (Gelfert 2003, Massimi 2004, Morrison 1990). So if we 
applied Hacking’s criterion we would, sometimes, end up accepting entities that are 
contentious among the relevant experts or even admitted to be fictitious. In other words, 
the criterion may recommend ontological commitment even in cases where the 
scientific community has not unambiguously decided in favour of the existence of an 
entity. 
Cartwright’s exclusive emphasis on causal inference faces the same problem. 
Consider her account of  
the radiometer, invented by William Crookes in 1853. It is a little windmill 
whose vanes, black on one side, white on the other, are enclosed in an evacuated 
glass bowl. When light falls on the radiometer, the vanes rotate. It was … agreed 
that the rotation is due to the action of the gas molecules left inside the 
evacuated bowl. … in 1879 James Clerk Maxwell, using the kinetic theory of 
gases, argued that … differential heating in the gas produces tangential stresses, 
which cause slippage of the gas over the surface. As the gas flows around the 
edge, it pulls the vanes with it. 
… 
The molecules in Crookes's radiometer are invisible, and the tangential stresses 
are not the kinds of things one would have expected to see in the first place. Yet, 
… I believe in both. I believe in them because I accept Maxwell's causal account 
of why the vanes move around (Cartwright 1983, 5-6).  
As with Hacking’s manipulability criterion, the problem here is the anticipation of the 
verdict of the scientific community. Molecules remained controversial entities till the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century. Apparently, many physicists and chemists were not (and, 
I think, should not have been) swayed by Maxwell’s causal account of the radiometer’s 
function to believe in molecules. The moral of this case is that philosophers of science 
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should not anticipate (or even replace) the judgements of the scientific community by 
oversimplifying the issues at stake. Rather they should attend to the multitude of 
theoretical and experimental practices that are brought to bear on the existence of 
hidden entities. Philosophy of science has to accommodate the complexity of its subject 
matter. To that effect, history of science has an indispensable role to play. 
 
6. Towards a historiographically adequate philosophical attitude 
It is clear, to my mind at least, that manipulability cannot get around the hypothetical 
status of hidden entities. Is there a philosophical attitude towards those entities that can 
do justice to their history? Among other things, we have to do justice to the historical 
fact that important scientists believed passionately (and, I think, for good reasons) in 
entities that turned out to be fictitious. We have to understand, in epistemic terms, how 
it was possible, or even reasonable, for a physicist of J. J. Thomson’s caliber to claim in 
1909 that "The ether is not a fantastic creation of the speculative philosopher; it is as 
essential to us as the air we breathe" (J. J. Thomson 1909, 267). By immersing ourselves 
in the theoretical, instrumental, and experimental practices of past scientists, in their 
"virtual reality" as it were (Seager 1995), it becomes possible to understand how the 
scientists in question developed an, often strong, conviction in the reality of their 
objects of study. At the same time, however, the fact that some of those objects have 
perished motivates us to distance ourselves from the ontological commitments of the 
historical actors. Thus, the attitude I am recommending drives a wedge between 
immersion in a worldview (and a set of practices) and belief in the hidden entities 
associated with it. Lacking a better term, I will call this attitude "methodological 
agnosticism". 
 
7. Sidestepping the problem of realism  
Methodological agnosticism does not amount to antirealism. Rather it is an attempt to 
sidestep the normative aspects of the problem of realism and focus on issues which, 
though related to it, have a predominantly descriptive and interpretative character.
6
 I 
will touch upon three of those issues: 
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7a. To begin with, there is a descriptive counterpart to the normative philosophical 
problem. How do the scientists themselves become convinced that a hidden entity is 
real? Although I would hesitate to give a simple answer to such a huge question, I 
would stress two factors that are important in this respect: The first factor has to do with 
theory. The empirical adequacy, the explanatory power, and the fertility of the theory 
positing a hidden entity are usually considered among the most important reasons for 
believing in its existence.
7
 The second factor is related to experiment. The over-
determination of a hidden entity’s properties in different experimental settings is often 
an important reason in favour of its existence. For example, in the late 19
th
 and the early 
20
th
 centuries the charge to mass ratio of the electron was determined by different 
methods and in different kinds of experiments: on cathode rays, on ß-rays, on 
thermionic emission, and in spectroscopy. The approximate agreement of the results 
obtained convinced many physicists that electrons were real entities. 
 
7b. The second issue concerns the role of experimentation on hidden entities in the 
construction of their representations. How do scientists infer the characteristics of such 
entities by experimenting on them? Here I will draw on two philosophers: Pierre Duhem 
and Norwood Russell Hanson. As Duhem argued, a hidden entity is associated with a 
constellation of effects: an electric current, for instance, "may manifest itself not only in 
mechanical effects but in effects that are chemical, thermal, luminous, etc" (Duhem 
1954, 151). What we need to understand in specific cases is how these different effects 
are held together as manifestations of a single entity.
8
 
Furthermore, we need to understand how specific characteristics are attributed to 
those entities. Hanson’s remark that "The idea of … atomic particles is a conceptual 
construction 'backwards' from what we observe in the large" is particularly helpful in 
this respect (Hanson 1963, p. 47). When an experimentally produced phenomenon is 
attributed to a hidden entity, the characteristics of the phenomenon that are of interest to 
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the scientist(s) must be linked with the putative properties and behaviour of the entity in 
question. As Cartwright has put it, echoing Hanson’s idea,  
Given our general knowledge about what kinds of conditions and happenings are 
possible in the circumstances, we reason backwards from the detailed structure 
of the effects to exactly what characteristics the causes must have in order to 
bring them about (Cartwright 1983, 6). 
For instance, in late 19
th
 century spectroscopy the phenomena observed in the laboratory 
had three salient characteristics: the frequency, intensity, and polarization of spectral 
lines. Once spectral lines were attributed to a hidden entity, the electron within the 
atom, their characteristics had to be linked with the properties and behaviour of that 
entity. The frequency, intensity, and polarization of spectral lines were correlated with 
the frequency, amplitude, and direction of vibration of the electron within the atom. In 
that way, experimentally obtained information guided the articulation of the 
representation of the electron. 
A related question concerns the measurement of hidden entities. Since the late 
nineteenth century various properties of hidden entities have been measured, the mass 
and charge of elementary particles being among the most prominent. How is it possible 
to measure something that is hidden? The process of measurement in this case is very 
similar to Newton’s "deduction from the phenomena". Given the hypothesis that an 
entity exists and that it is subject to certain laws, it is possible to use experimental 
results to fill in the blanks in the description of the entity. Thus, the measurement of 
hidden entities can be represented as "the continuation of theory construction by other 
means" (van Fraassen 1980b, 673). 
Again, one sees the potential significance of philosophy of science to history of 
science. Philosophical views about the character and function of hidden entities may 
guide historical analysis. 
 
7c. We should grant, I think, that theory is crucial for the experimental investigation of 
hidden entities. We should still ask, however, whether these entities qua experimental 
objects have any independence from their theoretical representations. In other words, do 
they have a life of their own? I think that they do, and this is an insight of lasting value 
in Hacking’s and Cartwright’s "experimentalism". A considerable part of our 
 13 
knowledge of hidden entities derives from experiment and, in an important sense, is 
partly independent from theory. First, it is often the case that scientists are involved in 
exploratory experimentation on hidden entities, without being guided by a full-fledged 
theoretical account of their nature (Clarke 2001, 711; Steinle 1997, 2002). That was the 
case, for example, in experimentation on cathode rays during the last quarter of the 19
th
 
century (Hiebert 1995). Furthermore, experimentally determined properties of hidden 
entities are often incorporated into very different theoretical representations of them. 
Scientists who may disagree about the ultimate nature of those entities may come to 
agree about their experimentally determined properties. Those properties may, in turn, 
become essential for identifying their carriers in different experimental settings. For 
instance, J. J. Thomson in England, Walter Kaufmann in Germany, and Paul Villard in 
France had very different ideas about the ultimate nature of cathode rays. Thomson 
identified them with subatomic particles; Kaufmann represented them as ether waves; 
and Villard believed that they were charged hydrogen particles. All of them, however, 
agreed on the value of their mass to charge ratio.
9
 
 
To conclude, I hope I have showed that our understanding of hidden entities and 
their role in experimental practice can be enhanced by adopting an integrated historical-
cum-philosophical approach. On the one hand, philosophical reflection on the problem 
of entity realism has a lot to gain by examining historically how those entities were 
introduced and investigated (cf. Achinstein 2007). On the other hand, the historical 
analysis of the careers of those entities may profit from philosophical reflection on their 
existence and their role in scientific practice. 
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